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Abstract
A trusted quantum relay is introduced to enable quantum key distribution
links to form the basic legs in a quantum key distribution network. The idea
is based on the well-known intercept/resend eavesdropping. The same scheme
can be used to make quantum key distribution between several parties. No
entanglement is required.
1 Introduction
In the field of quantum information, quantum key distribution [1, 2] is
the application which is more developed, to the point that commercial
prototypes exist. The strength of quantum key distribution namely that
security is based on the basic laws of quantum physics, is somehow also
its weakness. The fact that measurements will disturb the state, that
perfect quantum cloning is not possible, makes it impossible to make,
for example, perfect quantum repeaters, which puts a limitation on the
practical implementations.
Until now quantum key distribution has mainly been considered a
point-to-point link between Alice and Bob. Howover, recently discussion
has started on how to form quantum key distribution networks. And
not only theoretical networks where one can imagine using distributed
multipartite entanglement and prolong the distance with entanglement
swapping, but practical networks which can be implemented with todays
technology.
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We suggest a very simple quantum relay, which when trusted can be
used as a basic building block in forming a network. The relay is basically
performing the well-known intercept/resend eavesdropping strategy [3],
but is cooperating with Alice and Bob. The protocol can also be seen as
a concatenation of quantum key distribution protocols. The requirement
is that the relay has to be trusted, since in principle the relay will know
the key generated by Alice and Bob.
As always nothing comes for free, and the price that Alice and Bob
have to pay is a lower key generation rate. This may put some practical
limitations to how many relays a network can contain. On the other
hand, due to the simple working structure of the quantum relay, it is
easy to implement different parts of a network with different quantum
key distribution platforms. Which means that some parts of the network
can be carried out by fiber implementations, for example within cites,
whereas the connection between cities could be carried out by, for exam-
ple, free space implementation either by line of sight or even ground to
satellite.
It should be stressed that as far as a QKD network is built without
quantum repeaters using entanglement swapping, teleportation etc. and
is implemented only in fibers and with the quantum relays we introduce
in this paper, the maximum distance is still limited to around 100km.
This point will be discussed in details in section 5.
We base the protocol on the BB84 protocol for quantum cryptography
[1]. However, it should be possible to consider a similar scenario using
other protocols for quantum key distribution.
The paper is organized as follows: In section 2, we present the sim-
plest scenario, Alice and Bob and in the middle a trusted quantum re-
lay, Trent [4]. In section 3, we introduce the eavesdropper and consider
simple intercept/resend eavesdropping. Section 4 is dedicated to a dis-
cussion of how to use the proposed protocol for multi partite quantum
key distribution and of how to get the most out of the data. Section 5 is
dedicated to a discussion of the impossibility of extending the distance
between Alice and Bob in some situations. In section 6, we discuss the
network structure and topology of a simple network for quantum key
distribution. Finally, in section 7 we conclude.
2 Trusted quantum relay: the protocol
Suppose that Alice and Bob want to establish a secret key by means of
quantum key distribution and that they use the BB84 protocol, however
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Figure 1: The basic scenario: Alice and Bob are connected via the trusted quantum
relay station, Trent.
their conditions are such that the need to go via a trusted quantum relay,
Trent. Trent’s role in the protocol is basically to perform the well-known
intercept/resend eavesdropping — but afterwords assist Alice and Bob
in the sifting procedure. Step by step the protocol becomes:
1. Alice prepares a qubit in one of the four states ±x or ±y, and sends
it to Trent
2. Trent measures, as if he was Bob, in either the X or the Y basis.
According to the result of his measurement, he prepares the same
state that he found in this measurement and sends it to Bob.
3. Bob measures in the X or the Y basis.
4. Alice, Trent and Bob repeat the first 3 steps many times.
5. The relay sifting procedure: Trent announces in which basis has
measured each qubit, Alice and Bob take note of this; if there are
more than one relay, each one of them announces the basis used for
each qubit; The role of Trent (or of all relays) is now over.
6. Alice and Bob sifting procedure: Alice and Bob announce to each
other which basis they used, and they keep only the qubits for which
Alice, Trent and Bob used the same basis.
7. Alice and Bob proceed with the estimate of the error rate followed
by error correction and privacy amplification to obtain a secret key
— as in the standard BB84 protocol.
Notice that after step 5, Alice and Bob can use a different classical
communication channel since Trent does not need to be informed of the
following steps. It is also clear that Alice and Bob loose more data during
the sifting procedure than they do in the standard BB84 protocol. In a
point to point link, they keep about 1/2 of the raw data. Whereas with
Trent in the middle there is only probability 1/4 that they all used the
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Figure 2: The basic eavesdropping scenario: Alice-Eve-Trent-Eve’ and Bob.
same basis, which means that they can only keep 1/4 of the data. In the
presence of N relays, this becomes 1/2N+1.
If Trent is acting correctly, that is he performs the measurements
defined by the protocol, resends the states he finds and announces the
bases he has used, then Alice and Bob theoretically should find no errors
in the sifted key. The situation is hereafter the same as for the standard
BB84; Alice and Bob can continue the classical part of the protocol and
obtain a secret key.
It is clear that Alice and Bob need to trust Trent, since they (in ideal
situations) all share the same raw data, hence if Trent listens on the
classical communication between Alice and Bob, he can obtain the same
secret key. From this point of view, making Trent listen to the classical
communication between Alice and Bob, leads to all three (or N) of them
to share the same secret key. This is correct if there will not be errors
or attacks by Eve, as we will see in the next section.
3 Including the eavesdropper, Eve
As always the security is based on what Eve can do and how much in-
formation she can retrieve from the system. In this case the full analysis
becomes more complicated because Eve can eavesdrop on two channels:
Channel 1, from Alice to Trent and channel 2, from Trent to Bob.
However, there is one very important point which should be kept in
mind, namely that the two channels are used at different times. Which
means that Eve at no point has access to both channels at the same
time. This prevents Eve from doing some kinds of joint attacks on the
two channels, at most she could let the same ancilla interact with both
channels and make one measurement. However these general consider-
ations are beyond the scope of this paper. Here we will only consider
very simple attacks like the intercept/resend eavesdropping in both chan-
4
nels, as these will give a first indication of the security of the protocol.
Moreover, it has recently been shown [5], that if the eavesdropper has
no quantum memory, the optimal eavesdropping attack is actually the
intercept/resend.
Lets first consider Eve doing an intercept/resend attack. If she at-
tacks only one channel, either 1 or 2, there is no difference in the analysis
with respect to the standard BB84. For example, the amount of errors
she introduces in the sifted key are the same, approximately 25%.
Consider then the case in which Eve attacks both channels with in-
tercept/resend. The first question is about the amount of information
that she can get by attacking both channels. Doing intercept/resend
on the first channel, for half of the qubits sent by Alice, Eve uses the
same basis, thus she obtains 1 bit of information per qubit, i.e. all the
information sent by Alice. For these qubits Eve can gain no more infor-
mation by eavesdropping on the second channel. For the other half of
the qubits sent by Alice, Eve uses the wrong basis on the first channel,
and obtains a fully random result, so 0 bit of information. Moreover she
sends to Trent a random bit, which means that the result of Trent is
random, and even if Eve would eavesdrop a second time on the qubit
sent by Trent, she would obtain a random result. Thus Eve does not
increase her information by eavesdropping on both channels.
Lets now consider the errors she introduces by eavesdropping twice,
this analysis will anyway give us some insights in the properties of our
protocol.
If she attacks both channels with intercept/resend, she has to decide
if she chooses at random the bases she uses for both channels, or in
the second channel she uses the same basis she has used for the first.
It is easy to see that if she chooses independently the bases in the two
channels, she introduces approximately 37.5% errors in Bob’s sifted key.
This result can be obtained as follows. After she eavesdrops on the first
channel, Eve introduces 25% of error in Trent’s sifted key. Since Eve
eavesdrops independently in the second channel, she will introduce 25%
of errors on the 75% of right qubits of the sifted key sent by Trent, thus
adding other 18.75% of wrong bits to Bob’s sifted key. For the 25% of
wrong bits of the sifted key sent by Trent to Bob, again Eve introduces
25% of errors for Bob with respect to Trent, but now this means that
Bob would measure the correct bit with respect to Alice. So for 6.25%
of wrong bits of the sifted key sent by Trent to Bob, Bob will measure
a correct bit with respect to Alice. The total error in Bob’s sifted key is
then (25 + 18.75− 6.25) = 37.5%
Notice that Trent and Bob sifted keys are different, in particular
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among the different bits there are 6.25% of errors in Trent sifted key
with respect to Alice sifted key, which are not present in Bob sifted
key. Thus, when Alice and Bob run the error correction algorithm, they
will not correct these errors. Even if Trent follows Alice and Bob error
correction, Trent’s key will still be different from Alice and Bob’s key.
Since we have assumed that Eve does independent attacks on both
channels, it follows that this result can be applied also to experimental
errors. Let assume that both channel 1 and 2 have independent exper-
imental errors, that is QBER value Di (0 ≤ Di ≤ 1). Thus it follows
that in Trent sifted key statistically there are D1D2 errors not present in
Bob’s sifted key, with respect to Alice sifted key. If Trent follows Alice
and Bob error correction and privacy amplification, he would get a key
very similar but not identical to the one shared by Alice and Bob. Notice
that the knowledge of Trent on the sifted key is very large (Di must be
small for QKD to be able to produce a secret key), thus it is not possible
in general to arbitrarily reduce Trent’s information on the final key as it
is done for Eve in the privacy amplification phase of the protocol. Thus
even if Trent secret key will not be exactly identical to the one of Alice
and Bob, Trent will have too much information on the key and will have
to be trusted.
Alternatively Eve can use in the second channel the same basis she
used in the first. The analysis is similar to the previous one, and one
obtains that Eve introduces in Bob sifted key 25% of errors, as if she
would eavesdrop just on one channel. But this time the number of wrong
bits in Trent sifted key which are correct in Bob is up to 12.5%. This
different result is due to the fact that the errors introduced by Eve in
the two channels are correlated and not independent.
Notice that as long as Trent does not take part in the error correction,
but only in the sifting procedure, it is impossible for Alice and Bob to
know where an error has occurred, if it has occurred in the first or the
second channel; that is effectively Alice and Bob have only one long
communication channel.
Even for optimal eavesdropping strategies, i.e. when Eve uses both
an ancilla and a quantum memory, we expect to find that the best that
she can do is to eavesdrop in only one channel. Except perhaps for the
very special situation where Eve let’s the same ancilla interact with the
qubit in both channels. However, an analysis of these attacks is beyond
the scope of this paper.
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1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
Alice (A) X X X X Y Y Y Y
Carol (C) X X Y Y Y Y X X
Bob (B) X Y X Y Y X Y X
Secret Key A-C-B A-C – C-B A-C-B A-C – C-B
Table 1: The table displays all the different measurement situations, and how they
can be used to create secret key between the different parties. Boldface indicates
the parties which can generate a secret key in the given situation because they have
used the same basis, the names are also given in the last line.
4 Key distribution between several parties
As we have seen in the previous sections, if there would be no experimen-
tal errors, the protocol described in section 2 would, with minor mod-
ifications, become a quantum key distribution protocol between three
parties. It would in principle be enough for Trent to listen to Alice and
Bob’s public discussion and perform the error correction and privacy am-
plification algorithm as they do. To allow Trent to share the final secret
key with Alice and Bob, it is necessary to modify the protocol, adding a
modified error correction phase.
In the modified protocol we present in this section, the third party’s
name is Carol instead of Trent, who is only a trusted arbitrator. The
difference between Trent and Carol is that Carol takes part in error
correction and privacy amplification. Hence she actively takes part in
the full protocol as a third member on equal footing with Alice and Bob.
Concerning the error correction protocol, one possibility is to run it
in two steps. First there is an error correction run by Alice and Carol, to
which Bob listens and acts accordingly. At the end of this first run Carol
and Alice keys are identical. Then Alice (or Carol) runs another error
correction with Bob, now Carol (or Alice) listens and acts accordingly.
Notice that Carol in this case must implement a full QKD node, all
phases of the protocol must be run by Carol, and at the end all three
share the same identical key.
In this case a more detailed analysis for the quantum channel is pos-
sible, in the sense that during the error correction part of the protocol,
it will become evident where an error has occurred, if it was in channel
1 or channel 2, thanks to the fact that Carol participates in the error
correction phase.
As it has been described in section 2, including an extra party means
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loosing more data in the sifting procedure. This is because the probabil-
ity that the three parties all choose the same basis is only 1/4. Which
means that 3/4 of the data remains un-used. However, it is actually
possible to use a big part of the remaining data to create secret keys be-
tween Alice and Carol or Carol and Bob, because these parties in some
cases use the same basis and hence the protocol reduces to the tradi-
tional BB84 protocol for only two parties. The different measurement
combinations and who can create a secret key in a given situation is
shown in table 1. In this way we find the following use of the data: 1/4
of the data, columns 1 and 5, can be used to create a secret key between
all three parties; 1/4, cols. 2 and 6, for creating a secret key between
Alice and Carol; 1/4, cols. 4 and 8, for creating a secret key between
Carol and Bob; whereas the last 1/4 of the data, cols. 3 and 7, has to be
disregarded, since no secret key can be extracted from these data.
This means that actually 3/4 of the data can be used and only 1/4
remains to be thrown away. Notice one interesting point namely that as
long as data are distributed via a relay, Alice and Bob can not produce
a secure bipartite key between them. This is because even if Trent/Carol
is not actively participating in the error correction and privacy amplifi-
cation part of the protocol, he/she will always have a lot of information
on the key and has to be trusted.
In section 3 we argued that an eavesdropper could not benefit from
eavesdropping in both channels, because with Trent as a trusted arbi-
trator in the middle, Alice and Bob effectively share one long quantum
channel. However, this is no longer the case when Alice, Bob and Carol
are equal partners, since in this case the three parties have and analyze
independently the two channels. Moreover, for Eve to gain informa-
tion on all three keys she obviously will be forced to eavesdrop in both
channels.
5 Relaying and extending the distance
It would be very interesting to find ways to extend the reach of QKD
without implementing entanglement swapping, teleportation or resorting
to classical cryptography. At first sight it could seem that the protocol
presented in section 2 could always extend the distance between Alice
and Bob. This is not true, and we recall here the reasons for this.
As of today, QKD is limited to a range of about 100km, the main
limiting factor is due to losses. The main points of loss of photons
in today QKD system using optical fibers are (1) low efficiency of the
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detectors, approximately 10%, (2) losses in the fibers, characterized by α
in dB/Km which for the Telecom wavelength 1550nm has a typical value
of 0.25dB/Km. The losses of the detector are independent of the distance
between Alice and Bob, whereas the losses in the fibers are the real
limiting factor on the distance. In standard Telecom communications
in optical fibers, these losses are compensated by repeaters, which in
practice repopulate of the lost photons the wave-packet. Since QKD uses
single photons, once a photon is absorbed by the fiber there could not
be any kind of repeater which can recreate it. Thus quantum repeaters
which work in a similar way as the classical ones do not exist.
Let’s consider Alice, Trent and Bob and assume that the transmission
of the line connecting Alice with Trent is t1 and that of Trent with Bob
is t2, and that the two lines have length d1 and d2 respectively. Since
when a photon is absorbed before reaching Trent, obviously Trent cannot
send anything to Bob, Bob receives a fraction t1t2 of the photons sent
by Alice.
Consider now the case when Alice is directly connected to Bob with
a line of length d1 + d2. Since the transmission of a line is given by
t = 10−αd/10 (1)
the fraction of photons received by Bob is again t1t2. This argument is
of course very general and prevents the use of simple quantum relays to
extend the maximum distance of QKD systems in fibers.
The quantum relays we have presented in section 2 have thus mainly
two applications. The first is the possibility of realizing networks where
different platforms are used in different legs of the network, as optical
fibers and free space. The second is the possibility of realizing networks
with more than two participants, where the relay permits to connect
many Alices to many Bobs on request. These will be discussed in the
next section.
For completeness, in the Appendix we also describe a very simple
classical protocol with QKD relays which can always be used to extend
the distance between Alice and Bob.
6 Networks and Topology
The protocol we proposed in section 2 gives the possibility of building
more complicated network topologies. These in turn allow a better use
of resources and possibility of services used on-demand. Still there are
some limitations, the principal one being the fact that in the presence
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Alice
Bob
Trent
Figure 3: A simple network with Star topology between Alices and Bobs with Trents
as centers, and Full-Mesh between Trents
of N relays, the average final secret key length is reduced by at least a
factor 1/2N+1 of the original qubits sent by Alice.
The most suitable network that can be adopted with these relays
seems to be a Star topology between each Trent and all his Alices and
Bobs, and a Full-mesh topology between all Trents. Thus for example
one Trent could cover a metropolitan area and be connected by optical
fibers with the Alices and Bobs, whereas the trust centers, i.e. different
Trents, among themselves can be connected with free space links, even
through satellites.1
In Figure 3 we give an example of this network with four Trents.
Notice that the number of links between Trents grows as N2, but that
any link connecting one Alice to one Bob will pass either one Trent, if
Bob is in the same star as Alice, or two Trents if Bob is in another star.
In these networks it is only possible to create secret keys shared be-
1Of course this will be practically possible only if the transmission of the free space link will be
good enough to guarantee that enough qubits reach Bob, as we have discussed in section 5.
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tween one Alice and one Bob, and as we have seen in the previous section,
in case also with Trent/Carol.
7 Conclusions
We have introduced a quantum relay in order to form the basic leg in
a quantum key distribution network. The quantum relay performs in-
tercept/resend eavesdropping — but collaborates with Alice and Bob in
the sifting phase. The protocol can also be seen as a concatenation of
quantum key distribution protocols. We have used the well-known BB84
protocol. The quantum relay, Trent, has to be trusted, since he in prin-
ciple shares the same data with Alice and Bob. The cost for introducing
a quantum relay is a lower key generation rate. A minor modification in
the protocol allows for multi user quantum key distribution.
One big advantage is that the proposed quantum relay can be imple-
mented with todays technologies, and hence would make it possible to
form small networks for quantum key distribution. Another advantage
is that the nature of the relay is so simple that it allows to mix differ-
ent quantum key distribution platforms. For example, one could imagine
metropolitan areas connects via optical fiber links, whereas links between
cities may be served by free space links. More results on networking and
QKD will be presented in ref. [6].
It should be stressed again that the quantum relay has to be trusted,
which means that Trent collaborates fully with Alice and Bob. A first
analysis indicates that an eavesdropper who tries to learn the secret key
will not be able to get more information than in the standard BB84
protocol for two parties. And we conjecture that the security of the
protocol including Trent is the same as for the standard BB84.
Appendix
In this Appendix we describe very shortly another protocol including
quantum relays similar to the previous one, but in which the relaying
part is completely classical. This will allow actually to obtain an ex-
tension of the distance between Alice and Bob even with the current
implementations in optical fibers. Assume that Alice and Bob are con-
nected by N relays linearly, as in a chain. The protocol is as follows:
1. Each relay runs a full BB84 (or any QKD) protocol with both its
right and left peer; Alice and Bob, who are at the ends of the chain,
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run the protocol with the relay to their left/right; in this way N+1
different secret keys (possibly of different length) are established;
each relay knows 2 secret keys.
2. All relays announce publicy the XOR of the two secret keys (reduc-
ing the longest key to the length of the shortest discarding the high
order bits); The role of the relays ends here.
3. Alice and Bob take the XOR of their secret key with the XOR-key
announced by the next relay thus discovering the other secret key
of the relay; they proceed in this way until they get the secret key
of each other (in doing these operations all keys are always reduced
to the length of the shortest one by discarding the high order bits).
4. Alice and Bob concatenate all secret keys and run a privacy ampli-
fication algorithm on this; the order of magnitude of the shrinking
parameter can be estimated to be NL bits where L is the reduced
length of each secret key; The reason for this step is that in an-
nouncing publicy the XOR, Eve has learnt NL bits of information
which should be removed.
The final secret key has length L, which in practice is of the order of the
shortest of the N + 1 initial secret keys. With respect to the protocol
discussed in this paper, this protocol does not shrink the final secret
key depending on the number of relays. On the other side the role of
the relays is much higher, since they have to run each two full QKD
protocols, plus the managing the resulting secret keys. Moreover in this
case, also all relays can run steps 3 and 4, obtaining the exact final secret
key.
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